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Mark P. McKenna* 
 
Julie Cohen’s Between Truth and Power is, as Orly Lobel writes, a “dazzling 
tour de force” that “asks us to consider the new ways powerful actors extract 
valuable resources for gain and dominance.”1  As she has done so frequently, 
Cohen takes an incredibly complex story and weaves together a 
comprehensive narrative that changes the entire framing of legal questions.  
Agree or disagree with her diagnoses, no one who seriously engages this book 
will ever think about regulation in the information economy the same way. 
In January 2020 (seemingly a lifetime ago, given what 2020 would bring), 
we gathered leading thinkers about the governance of new technologies at 
Notre Dame Law School and spent a day reflecting on the book and 
considering its implications across a range of areas.  This symposium edition 
includes three essays that derive from those conversations, each focusing on 
just one of the many threads from that day. 
Ari Waldman takes up Cohen’s managerialism theme, focusing 
particularly on its impact on privacy.2  Waldman persuasively describes 
managerialized privacy as driving structures and mechanisms that “focus[] on 
minimizing . . . impact on . . . innovation” instead of prioritizing privacy’s 
substantive goals.3  Waldman characterizes the resulting privacy regime as 
“compliance in name only” and “merely symbolic.”4  One might instead call 
the regime compliance only. 
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 1 Orly Lobel, Biopolitical Opportunities: Between Datafication and Governance, 96 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 181, 181 (2021) (citing JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND 
POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (2019)). 
 2 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Outsourcing Privacy, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 194 
(2021). 
 3 Id. at 195. 
 4 Id. 
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Managerialism has two dimensions in Waldman’s telling—one at the 
level of regulatory apparatus, and one at the level of the entities being 
regulated.5  But these are deeply related: the managerialized regulatory 
apparatus is much more likely to defer to managerialized privacy compliance 
structures.6 
Here Waldman argues that the role of technology vendors is 
underappreciated in the privacy space.7  Outsourcing, Waldman suggests, is 
usually reserved to functions that lie outside the “core competencies” of a 
firm.8  “What does it say about companies” that they outsource important 
aspects of their privacy compliance while claiming that privacy matters to 
them so much?9 
Those companies’ reliance on outsourcing “chang[es] the medium 
through which . . . interpretation and implementation of legal rules . . . are 
performed—namely, from humans to technology.”10  “[O]utsourcing 
assessment management requires outsourcing legal interpretations” to 
“technologies . . . [that] embed[] . . . particular assumptions and 
interpretations of legal rules.”11  Similarly, incident response tools are 
marketed as guiding clients through (legally) “correct” responses and meeting 
mandatory timelines and notification requirements.12  De-identification 
software is said to meet anonymization requirements, “translating a legal 
requirement into coding language.”13 
Waldman fears that courts and regulators will defer to these tools, 
treating them as industry standards and therefore regarding them as sufficient 
to meet legal obligations.14  If that were to happen, the legal interpretations 
these technologies embed would, in a meaningful sense, create the new legal 
reality. 
Waldman also argues that increased reliance on outsourced privacy will 
exacerbate inequalities between large corporate interests and everyone else.15  
Large companies have the advantage of size and scale to shape vendor 
relationships and products and, as a result, they can frame the legal 
 
 5 See id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. at 195–96. 
 8 Id. at 197 (first citing James Brian Quinn, Strategic Outsourcing: Leveraging Knowledge 
Capabilities, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer 1999, at 9, 12; and then citing Peter Gottschalk & 
Hans Solli-Saether, Critical Success Factors from IT Outsourcing Theories: An Empirical Study, 
105 INDUS. MGMT. & DATA SYS. 685, 686 (2005)). 
 9 Id. at 196. 
 10 Id. at 197. 
 11 Id. at 200–01. 
 12 Id. at 202 (quoting RESILIENT, BREACH NOTIFICATION UNDER THE GENERAL DATA 
PROTECTION REGULATION: NEW CAPABILITIES IN THE IBM RESILIENT INCIDENT RESPONSE 
PLATFORM (2018), https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/9WYZP24P). 
 13 Id. at 203. 
 14 See id. at 194–95. 
 15 Id. at 204–05. 
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interpretations embedded in technology in ways that benefit them and not 
competitors or consumers.16 
Waldman also focuses on the big picture, describing several systemic 
dangers of managerialization of privacy, namely: (1) “reduc[ing] privacy to 
its codable pieces[;]” and (2) reducing privacy to the risk of being investigated 
(making it a compliance issue focused on corporate risk).17  Those shifts 
inherently focus employees on the interests of their corporate employers 
rather than on the interests of users, making privacy primarily about 
avoidance of a corporate problem rather than advancement of an affirmative 
goal.18 
In combination, outsourcing privacy compliance to technological tools 
risks erosion of legal expertise and loss of the qualitative dimensions that 
come with human judgment.19  It also erodes accountability.20  “Shifting . . . 
[to] the language of technology . . . empowers technologists” and 
“disempowers consumers, who [do not have] access to a technology-driven 
privacy discourse.”21  It is, after all, largely technologists that privacy law aims 
to constrain. 
Orly Lobel picks up Cohen’s call to “consider the new ways powerful 
actors extract valuable resources for gain and dominance.”22  But Lobel sees 
it as “a call to action,” and she seeks to identify “ways in which governments 
can engage in new forms of governance to leverage the very same biopolitical 
data extracted by private actors for profit purposes, in service of public goals 
of fairness, equality, and distributive justice.”23  Specifically, Lobel explores 
“how datafication can, and indeed should, be employed to aid regulatory 
research, enforcement, and accountability.”24 
Rather than accepting that new technologies must be used extractively, 
Lobel articulates “a more positive vision, one [that] can . . . be constructed 
through engagement with new capabilities and recognition of the 
opportunities that data can offer.”25  Specifically, Lobel highlights three 
examples of “opportunities within disruptive technological changes,” arguing 
that “policymakers have no choice but to . . . mirror, rather than attempt to 
block, these innovations.”26 
First, Lobel describes “[n]ew reforms . . . targeting . . . information 
asymmetries” regarding wage information, “imagin[ing] a role for digital 
platforms [to] create[] more systematic transparency” than “[s]elf-reported” 
 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 205–06. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 207–08. 
 20 Id. at 208–09. 
 21 Id. at 209. 
 22 Lobel, supra note 1, at 181 (citing COHEN, supra note 1). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 193. 
 26 Id. at 182. 
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information.27  New technologies can help “detect[] salary inequities, . . . 
uncover, and tame, persisting biases and narratives that contribute to 
inequality in the workplace” (e.g., “certain phrases used in [job ads]” that 
“decrease [the number of] women applicants”).28 
Lobel then focuses on ways that governments and private actors might 
turn data harvesting and extraction toward “public ends.”29  Here, she 
responds to Cohen’s powerful description of the way “law enables . . . data 
harvesting and data enclosure . . . via platforms extracting massive amounts of 
[data] from users, turning the data into profitable resources” and “claiming 
ownership over th[e] extracted information.”30 
But, Lobel notes, there’s nothing inevitable here—these tools can be 
used for public good.  New companies, for example, sometimes offer services 
that depend on scraping technologies “to cities to monitor short term rentals” 
to help ensure “compliance with local laws.”31  Importantly, however, Lobel 
notes that scraping has uncertain legal status, and for that sort of public-
oriented vision to come to fruition, the law would need to continue to evolve.32 
Lastly, Lobel suggests that new technologies can be harnessed for public 
health purposes.33  She notes, for example, the ways technologies have 
complemented responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, at least in some 
countries.34  One challenge here is a potential clash with privacy values.35  
Another is rejection of what some would regard as a form of tech solutionism.  
But Lobel remains optimistic that technology can serve a valuable role here 
too. 
Felicia Caponigri “proposes cultural heritage as a subject matter worthy 
of . . . analysis” in light of Cohen’s characterization of “labor, land, and 
money” as “tangible[s]” that have been “dematerialized . . . and then 
reified . . . as information.”36 
 
 27 Id. at 183. 
 28 Id. at 184. 
 29 Id. at 185. 
 30 Id. (citing COHEN, supra note 1, at 44–45). 
 31 Id. (citing Tom Banse, Pacific Northwest Cities Hire Outside Vendors to Police Airbnb-
Type Rentals, NW NEWS NETWORK (Aug. 22, 2018), 
https://www.nwnewsnetwork.org/post/pacific-northwest-cities-hire-outside-vendors-
police-airbnb-type-rentals). 
 32 Id. at 190 (“[I]n an age where data extraction is the key to tech’s future, web 
scraping law should be designed to enable more transparency, research, accountability, and 
competition.”). 
 33 See id. 
 34 Id. at 190–92. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Felicia Caponigri, Cultural Heritage Law Between Truth and Power: Law’s Evolution and 
Our Collective Cultural Interest in an Informational Economy, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
REFLECTION 163, 165–66 (2021) (“If cultural heritage is increasingly seen as information, 
as data to be consumed all over the world, how should cultural heritage law regulate this 
cultural information, if at all?”). 
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The most significant tension here is between cultural property’s 
traditional focus on the material object, which manifests in part in restrictions 
on reproductions and imposition of a duty to preserve the material object, 
and the institution of digitization efforts (which are themselves preservation 
tools).37  But when “[c]ultural property is reproduced and then becomes 
reified anew through images shared on Instagram[,] it exists as information 
or data with which we interact in networked infrastructures.”38 
Here’s a fundamental conflict: “[T]he reproductions of cultural 
properties on social media and digital platforms . . . now, at the very least, help 
produce the very public cultural interests in cultural property which Italian 
cultural property law is meant to preserve and protect.”39  How, then, can 
cultural property law evolve to recognize the value of digitization, and the 
reality that it creates new cultural meaning, when the concept itself is rooted 
in preservation? 
Caponigri also worries about power structures, as Cohen implores us to 
do.  More specifically, Caponigri wonders about the changes that will 
inevitably result from digitization if it shifts responsibility for determining 
what counts as cultural property away from public institutions and to private 
companies.40  The “who decides” question looms large in cultural property, 
since it purports to reflect common cultural value.  But we should be more 
worried about putting those decisions in private hands, for many of the 
reasons Cohen articulates. 
These essays come from very different perspectives and have different 
goals. But collectively they reflect the range of conversations Cohen’s book 
provokes, and we were grateful to have the opportunity to engage with such a 




 37 See id. at 172–73. 
 38 Id. at 172. 
 39 Id. at 173. 
 40 Id. at 176–77. 
